Singapore High Court clarifies limits on court challenges to arbitral decisions

For businesses and practitioners, this ruling significantly limits the scope for challenging decisions made by the SIAC in the Singapore courts.

Parties must carefully navigate procedural disputes within the arbitration process and cannot expect courts to intervene in procedural and administrative decisions made by the SIAC. 

Notably, the impact of this decision may be greater in the context of the new SIAC Rules 2025 that have significantly broadened the range of decisions which can be made by the registrar. 

Challenges to arbitral determinations must generally be pursued within the arbitration process itself or through a post-award setting aside application. 

The decision highlights the importance of carefully considering the selection of arbitral rules and locations. Although other arbitral institutional rules may allow greater scope for courts to review decisions, some other jurisdictions may adopt a more interventionist approach when faced with similar institutional rules. 

For institutions, it underscores the importance of exclusion clauses in their rules to protect against judicial intervention. For parties, this means that there are very limited avenues to challenge decisions by arbitral institutions like the SIAC in Singapore. 

Key findings

The dispute arose from oil sale contracts between parties, anonymised but referred to in the proceedings as DMZ and DNA, that contained SIAC arbitration clauses. DNA initiated arbitration proceedings, but DMZ contended that the SIAC registrar had wrongfully or arbitrarily changed its position on the commencement date of arbitration. This change meant that the DNA could potentially evade a time-bar defence. 

DMZ commenced the court proceedings and challenged the SIAC registrar’s decision, seeking declaratory relief that the date of commencement was when the registrar determined on the first instance.  

The central issue was whether the court had jurisdiction to review the SIAC registrar’s decision under the SIAC Rules 2016. 

DMZ argued that the SIAC had a contractual obligation to act in accordance with the SIAC Rules, and that the registrar had either no power under these rules to review or revise its earlier decision, or that it had acted outside of its powers in breach of the rules in coming to its later decision. 

The court accepted that the SIAC’s role is contractual, but held that Rule 40.2 expressly precludes judicial review of the registrar’s decision and found that even if the registrar’s decision was wrong, DMZ had no right to seek the court’s intervention in overturning it. 

The court reaffirmed the policy of minimal curial intervention, emphasising that arbitration is party-driven and that courts should not interfere unless expressly permitted by legislation.  

DMZ also argued that the registrar had no power to revisit a decision once it was made, after its initial determination, and therefore could not revise it later. The court disagreed, holding that the SIAC registrar retains a power to reconsider administrative and procedural decisions where necessary. 

The court emphasised that administrative and procedural decisions are inherently revisable, especially where they impact the fair administration of arbitration. 

This finding underscores that arbitral institutions have discretion to reconsider their own procedural rulings, provided any decisions align with their rules. 

The court acknowledged that arbitral procedure must comply with party agreements, but the proper avenue for challenging procedural irregularities, even those of an arbitral institute, is through an application to set aside an arbitral award under the UNCITRAL Model Law that has been incorporated into Singapore law via the International Arbitration Act (IAA). 

There is a limited ground for intervention when the registrar failed to exercise its discretion under Rule 3.3, to determine when the arbitration is deemed to have commenced, lawfully and in accordance with the SIAC Rules.  

Any intervention would come through challenging and setting aside any eventual arbitration award on the basis that the arbitration procedure was not conducted in accordance with the agreed rules, as stated under Article 34(2)(a)(iv) of the IAA. 

DMZ’s attempt to seek pre-award judicial review was premature and an abuse of process. The court therefore ordered the DMZ to pay indemnity costs. 

This clarification is significant as it reinforces the limited scope for pre-award judicial interference in arbitration proceedings, and the indemnity cost order serves as a warning to parties to refrain from contesting such decisions outside the limited avenues provided. 

Practical implications  

For arbitral institutions, this judgment has confirmed the effectiveness of exclusion clauses in their rules.

The SIAC Rules 2016, at Rule 40.2, expressly prohibit appeals or reviews of the SIAC registrar’s decisions in court, shielding the institution from most judicial scrutiny until an award is issued. 

Institutions operating in Singapore with similar provisions in their rules will find comfort in their efficacy. For others, it may be an opportune time to evaluate the need to include similar waivers and exclusions for greater administration efficiency, without being bogged down by challenges in court. 

Parties involved in drafting contracts should pay close attention to the arbitration rules of their chosen institution and their chosen seat. 

If an institution does not have a waiver of court review or the local arbitration law expressly permits court review, an arbitral institution’s administrative decisions could be challenged in court, potentially leading to delays and increased costs. 

Alternatively, if an institution does have such a waiver, which the SIAC does, and local arbitration law does not provide for court review, the parties will likely be bound by the arbitral institution’s procedural determinations, with no recourse to the courts except via a post-award challenge. 

Co-written by Wynne Tay of MPillay.